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Abstract
In various environments new agents may base their decisions on observations of actions taken by a few
other agents in the past. In this paper we analyze a broad class of such social learning processes, and
study under what circumstances the initial behavior of the population has a lasting effect. Our main result
shows that a population converges to the same behavior independently of the initial state, provided that
the expected number of actions observed by each agent is less than one. Moreover, in any environment in
which the expected number of observed actions is more than one, there is a learning rule for which the
initial state has a lasting impact on future behavior.
Keywords: Social learning, steady state, unique limiting behavior, path dependence. JEL Classifi-
cation: C73, D83.
1 Introduction
Agents must often make decisions without knowing the cost and benefits of the possible choices. In such
situations an inexperienced (or “newborn”) agent may learn from the experience of others, by basing his
decision, on observations of a few actions taken by other agents in the past (see, e.g., the social learning
models of Ellison & Fudenberg, 1993, 1995; Acemoglu et al., 2011). In other environments, agents interact
with random opponents, and an agent may base his choice of action on a few observations of how his current
opponent behaved in the past (as first described in Rosenthal, 1979, and further developed and applied to
various models of community enforcement in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game in (Nowak & Sigmund, 1998;
Takahashi, 2010; Heller & Mohlin, 2017)).
In this paper we analyze a broad class of social learning processes, and study under what circumstances
the initial behavior of the population has a lasting influence on the population’s behavior in the long run. Our
main result shows that if the expected number of actions that each new agent observes is less than one, then
the population converges to the same behavior independently of the initial state. Moreover, if the expected
number of observed actions is more than one, then there is a rule according to which agents learn from the
experience of others, such that if the agents follow this learning rule, then the environment admits multiple
steady states, and the initial state determines which steady states will prevail.
∗The paper was previously titled “When Is Social Learning Path-Dependent?”. This paper replaces an obsolete working paper
titled “Unique Stationary Behavior” that presented related results in a narrower setup. We thank Ron Peretz, Doron Ravid,
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Forskningsstiftelser (grant #P2016-0079:1) and the Swedish Research Council (grant #2015-01751) for their financial support.
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Overview of the Model We consider an infinite population of agents (a continuum of mass one). Time is
discrete and in every period each agent is faced with a choice among a fixed set of alternatives. Each agent in
the population is endowed with a type. The population state is a vector describing the aggregate distribution
of actions played by agents of each type. In each period a fixed share of the agents die and are replaced
with new agents. Each new agent observes a finite sequence of actions (called a sample) of random size. The
sample may consist of either past actions of random agents in the population (as in the social learning models
mentioned above) or past actions of the current random opponent (as in the community enforcement models
mentioned above). An environment is a tuple that specifies all the above components.
A profile of learning rules assigns to each type in the population a rule that determines the distribution
of actions played by a new agent as a function of the observed sample. The agent keeps playing the same
action throughout his life. The environment and the profile of learning rules jointly induce a mapping between
population states that determines a new population state for each initial state. A population state is a steady
state if it is a fixed point of this mapping.
Main Result Our main result (Theorem 2) fully characterizes which environments admit learning rules
with multiple steady states. Specifically, it shows that an environment admits a learning rule with more than
one multiple steady state if and only if the mean sample size is strictly more than one (or if agents always
observe a single action). In the opposite case, each profile of learning rules admits a unique steady state, and,
moreover, the population converges to the unique steady state from any initial state.
The intuition for the “only if” side is as follows. Since there is a deterministic mapping from what sample
an agent observes to what distribution of actions the agent plays, the only way to make an agent choose a
different distribution of actions is to show him a different sample. The probability that a sample induced by
one population state is different from a sample induced by another population state is bounded by the distance
between the two population states times the mean sample size. This implies that the mapping between states
is a contraction mapping whenever the mean sample size is less than one.
The “if” side relies on constructing a specific learning rule, according to which agents play action a′ if they
observe action a′ in their sample, and play action a′′ otherwise. One can show that such a learning rule always
admits two different steady states provided that the expected number of observed actions is greater than one.
We demonstrate that this sampling rule may be consistent with Bayesian inference and the agents using best
replies.
Extensions We extend our model to deal with non-stationary environments, in which the distribution of
sample sizes and the agents’ learning rules depend on calendar time, and we characterize when a non-stationary
environment admits a unique sequence of states, such that it converges to this sequence of states from any
initial population state. We further extend the model to time-dependent common stochastic shocks that
influence the learning rules of all agents, and we characterize when the initial population state may have a
lasting effect in such environments.
Our results so far have not assumed anything about the agents’ learning rules. Obviously, additional
information on the learning rules, may allow us to achieve stronger results. Next, we present a simple notion
that measures how responsive a learning rule is to different samples, and we use this notion to define the
effective sample size of a learning process (which is always weakly smaller than the simple mean sample size).
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Finally, we apply the notion of effective sample size to derive a tighter upper bound for learning processes that
admit unique steady states.
Related Literature Various papers have studied different aspects of the question of when the initial behav-
ior of the population has lasting effects on social learning processes. Most of this literature focuses on specific
learning rules, according to which new (or revising) agents myopically best reply to the empirical frequency of
the observed actions. Arthur (1989) (see related models and extensions in Arthur, 1994; Kaniovski & Young,
1995; Smith & Sorensen, 2014) studies games in which agents sequentially choose which competing technology
to adopt, and he shows that social learning is path-dependent if the technologies have increasing returns.
Kandori et al. (1993) and Young (1993a) study models of finite large populations that are involved in a
social learning process, and agents occasionally make mistakes (e.g., an agent adopts a technology that is not
his myopic best reply to his sampled information). They show that the path dependency of the social learning
process vanishes when infinite time horizons are considered. In many cases, when the probability of mistakes
is sufficiently small the population spends almost all the time in a unique “stochastically stable state,” which
is independent of the initial state. A key difference between our model and theirs is that we model an infinite
population, rather than a large finite population. In Section 8, we discuss the relations between the present
paper and the literature on stochastic stability, and, in particular, the implications of our results for finite
large populations.
Banerjee & Fudenberg (2004) study a model with a continuum of agents in which a fixed share of new agents
in each period choose one of two technologies. There are two possible states of nature, and each technology
has a higher quality in one of these states. Each agent, after he observes l past actions and a noisy signal
about the quality of each technology, chooses the technology with the higher expected quality, conditional
on the information that he has observed. Banerjee & Fudenberg show that when l ≥ 2 the behavior of the
population converges to everyone choosing the efficient technology, while if l = 1 the population converges to
an inefficient state in which only some of the agents choose the (ex-post) better technology.
Sandholm (2001) shows that when each new agent observes k actions and the game admits a 1k -dominant
action a∗ (i.e., action a∗ is the unique best reply against any mixed strategy assigning a mass of at least 1k
to a∗), then social learning converges to this action regardless of the initial state. Recently, Oyama et al.
(2015) strengthened this result by extending it to iterated p-dominant actions, and by showing that global
convergence is fast.
Our model differs from all the above-mentioned research in that we study general environments and arbi-
trary learning rules. Specifically, we ask what properties of the agents’ sampling procedures imply that any
learning rule admits a unique steady state and global convergence to this state, whereas the existing literature
focuses on the dynamic behavior induced by a specific learning rule (in most of the literature, the agents
myopically best reply to specific payoffs, such as those induced by competing technologies with increasing
returns).
Structure We present motivating examples in Section 2. The basic model is described in Section 3. Section
4 presents our main results. Section 5 generalizes the basic model to heterogeneous populations. In Section
6 we extend the analysis to non-stationary learning processes and to common shocks. In Section 7 we define
the responsiveness of a learning rule, and use it to achieve a stronger sufficient condition for an environment
to admit a unique steady state. We conclude in Section 8. Technical proofs are presented in the Appendix.
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2 Motivating Examples
In this section we present three motivating examples, which will be revisited further below to demonstrate the
applicability of our model and the implications of our results. In all the examples the population is modeled as
a continuum of mass one, and time is discrete. The main example deals with social learning with competing
technologies, while the other two examples study situations in which agents are randomly matched to play a
two-player game.
Example 1 (Main Motivating Example: Competing Technologies with Increasing Returns1). Consider a
population in which in each period a share of β ∈ (0, 1) of the incumbent agents die, and are replaced with
new agents. Each new agent chooses one of two competing technologies with increasing returns a′ and a′′,
which he adopts for the rest of his life. A share of 99% of the new agents, before making their own choice,
observe the technology followed by a single incumbent. We consider two cases for what the remaining 1% of
the new agents observe before they choose a technology: (I) they observe no actions, and (II) they observe
three actions (as summarized in Table 1). Half of the agents have a slight preference for technology a′, and the
remaining half have a slight preference for technology a′′. These preferences are much smaller than preferences
over payoff differences that are due to the fact that the technologies have increasing returns. For example,
assume that if 51% of the population follows technology a′, then an agent prefers technology a′ regardless of
his own idiosyncratic preference.
A population state αt ∈ [0, 1] describes the share of agents who use technology a′ at time t. New agents
are uncertain about the initial population state2 α1. The common prior about the initial state is that α1 is
uniformly distributed on [30%, 70%].
The following stationary behavior of new agents constitutes a Nash equilibrium in this environment:3
1. An agent who does not observe any incumbent chooses a technology based on his idiosyncratic prefer-
ences.
2. An agent who observes a single incumbent chooses the technology played by the observed incumbent
due to the increasing returns of the technologies. This is because conditional on the agent observing an
incumbent following technology a in round t, a majority of the agents at time t are more likely to follow
technology a′.
3. An agent who observes three incumbents chooses the technology played by a majority of the sample (due
to the increasing returns of the technologies).
One can show that in Case (I), in which the mean sample size of a new agent is slightly less than one, the
population converges to a unique steady state in which half of the agents follow each technology. By contrast,
in Case (II), in which the mean sample size is slightly more than one, the initial behavior of the population has
a lasting effect. Specifically, the population converges to everyone following technology a if initially a majority
of the agents followed technology a′ (i.e., if α1 > 50%), and the population converges to everyone following
technology a′′ if α1 < 50%.
1The example is similar to the model of Banerjee & Fudenberg (2004), except that the technologies have increasing returns,
rather than having unknown inherent different qualities.
2As argued by Banerjee & Fudenberg (2004, p. 5), the aggregate uncertainty about the initial population state may reflect
the choices of a group of “early adopters” whose preferences are uncertain even at the aggregate level.
3This equilibrium is unique if either each agent is sufficiently short-lived (i.e., β is sufficiently large), or if agents sufficiently
discount the future.
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Table 1: Summary of the Two Cases in Example 1
Case Probability of Observing MeanSample Size Convergence and steady states0 actions 1 action 3 actions
I 1% 99% - 0.99 Global convergence to 50%–50%
II - 99% 1% 1.02 Convergence to a′ if α1 > 0.5;
convergence to a′′ if α1 < 0.5.
Example 2 (Community Enforcement in the Prisoner’s Dilemma). Consider a population in which in each
round each agent is randomly matched with to opponents, and plays a Prisoner’s Dilemma with each of them.
The population includes two types of agents. A share of 99% of the agents are of the first type. In round one,
each agent of type one defects with probability α1 in each match. In each later round, each agent of type 1
observes in each match a single action played in the previous round by his current opponent, and the agent
plays this observed action in the current match. The remaining 1% of the agents are of the second type. In
round one, each agent of type 2 defects with probability α2 in each match. We consider two different cases for
the observations and behavior of type 2 in each match in each later round: (I) each agent of type 2 observes
no actions, and defects with probability α2, and (II) each agent of type 2 observes the three actions played
by his partner in the three matches played by the partner in the previous round, and the agent defects if and
only if the partner has defected in at least two of the three observed matches.
One can show that in Case (I), in which the mean sample size of a random agent is slightly less than one,
the population globally converges to a unique steady state in which in each round a share of α2 of the agents
of each type defect in each round. By contrast, in Case (II), in which the mean sample size of a random agent
is slightly more than one, the initial behavior of the population has lasting effects. Specifically, the population
converges to everyone defecting if the initial probability of defection of a random agent is more than half (i.e.,
if α¯ := 99% · α1 + 1% · α2 > 50%), and the population converges to everyone cooperating if α¯ < 50%.
Example 3 (Rock-Paper-Scissors). Consider a population in which each agent is randomly matched in each
round to play the rock-paper-scissors game. Each player has three pure actions (rock, paper, scissors), and
each action is the unique best reply to the previous action (modulo 3). In the initial round t = 1 the aggregate
distributions of actions is γˆ ∈ ∆ (rock, paper, scissors). In each later round, each agent observes the opponent’s
action in the previous round with probability p, and best replies to the observed action. With the remaining
probability of 1 − p the agent observes no actions, and plays the mixed action γ′ ∈ ∆ (rock, paper, scissors).
Observe that the parameter p is equal to the mean sample size of a random agent. If p = 1 it is immediate that
the population’s behavior cycles “around” permutations of the initial behavior (as is common in evolutionary
models of rock-paper-scissors; see, e.g., the analysis in Cason et al., 2014). Formally, let t ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...}:
1. In round 3 · t+ 1 agents play rock with a probability of γˆ (rock), paper with a probability of γˆ (paper),
and scissors with a probability of γˆ (scissors).
2. In round 3 · t+ 2 agents play rock with a probability of γˆ (scissors), paper with a probability of γˆ (rock),
and scissors with a probability of γˆ (paper).
3. In round 3 ·t+3 agents play rock with a probability of γˆ (paper), paper with a probability of γˆ (scissors),
and scissors with a probability of γˆ (rock).
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However, when p < 1, one can show that the population converges to the following unique behavior (regardless
of the initial behavior α0):
Pr (rock) = γ
′ (rock) + p · γ′ (scissors) + p2 · γ′ (paper)
1 + p+ p2 ,
Pr (paper) = γ
′ (paper) + p · γ′ (rock) + p2 · γ′ (scissors)
1 + p+ p2 .
Pr (scissors) = γ
′ (scissors) + p · γ′ (paper) + p2 · γ′ (rock)
1 + p+ p2 ,
Note that when p is close to one, the unique behavior is close to the uniform mixed profile that assigns a
probability of 13 to each action.4
3 Basic Model
Throughout the paper we restrict attention to distributions with a finite support. Given a (possibly infinite)
set X, let ∆ (X) denote the set of distributions over this set that have a finite support. With a slight abuse
of notation we use x ∈ X to denote the degenerate distribution µ ∈ ∆ (X) that assigns probability one to x
(i.e., we write µ ≡ x if µ (x) = 1). We use N to denote the set of natural numbers including zero.
Population state. Consider an infinite population of agents.5 More precisely, the population consists of
continuum of agents with mass one. Time is discrete and in every period (or “round”) each agent is faced with
a choice among a fixed set of alternatives A. Let A be a finite set of at least two actions (i.e., |A| ≥ 2).
The population state (or state for short) is identified with the aggregate distribution of actions played in
the population, denoted γ ∈ ∆ (A). Let Γ denote the set of all population states.
New/Revising agents. In each period, a share of 0 < β ≤ 1 of the agents exit the population and are
replaced with new agents, while the remaining 1− β share of the agents play the same action as they played
in the past (see, e.g., Banerjee & Fudenberg, 2004). Each new agent chooses an action based on a sample of a
few actions of incumbents. The agent then keeps playing this chosen action throughout his active life, possibly
because the initial choice requires a substantial action-specific investment, and it is too costly for an agent to
reinvest in a different action later on. The model can also be interpreted as describing a fixed population in
which each agent reevaluates his action only every 1β periods (under this interpretation, when the sample is
non-empty, the first observed action might be interpreted as the revising agent’s own past action).
Sample. Each new agent observes a finite sequence of actions (or sample). The size of the observed sample
is a random variable with a distribution ν ∈ ∆ (N). Let M denote the set of all feasible samples, i.e.,
M = ∪l∈supp(ν)Al,
4Observe that the analysis depends only on the ordinal best-reply correspondence over pure actions, and is independent of the
cardinal payoffs. The uniform mixed profile is not necessarily the Nash equilibrium of the underlying game, as the latter depends
on the cardinal payoffs.
5In Section 8, we discuss the implications of our results for large finite populations.
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where A0 = {∅} is a singleton consisting of the empty sample ∅. Let l¯ = max (supp (ν)) <∞ be the maximal
sample size. Note that M is finite in virtue of the finite-support assumption. For each sample size l ∈ N, let
ψl : Γ → ∆
(
Al
)
denote the distribution of samples observed by each agent in the population (or sampling
rule for short), conditional on the sample having size l. A typical sample of size l is represented by the vector
−→a = (a1, ..., al).
We assume that each agent independently samples different agents, and observes a random action played
by each of these agents. This kind of sampling is common in models of social learning (see, e.g., Ellison &
Fudenberg, 1995; Banerjee & Fudenberg, 2004). Formally, we define for each sample size l ∈ N, each state
γ ∈ Γ, and each sample (a1, ..., al),
ψl,γ (a1, ..., al) =
∏
1≤i≤l
γ (ai) . (1)
Environment. An environment is a tuple
E = (A, β, ν)
that includes the three components described above: a finite set of actions A, a fraction of new agents at each
stage β, and a distribution of sample sizes ν.
Given environment E = (A, β, ν), let µl denote the mean sample size, i.e., the expected number of actions
observed by a random agent in the population. Formally:
µl =
∑
l∈supp(ν)
ν (l) · l.
Learning rule and stationary learning process. Each new agent chooses his action in the new population
state by following a stationary (i.e., time-independent) learning rule σ : M → ∆ (A). That is, a new agent
who observes sample m ∈ M plays action a with probability σm (a) . The remaining 1 − β agents play the
same action as in the previous round.
A stationary learning process (or learning process for short) is a pair
P = (E, σ) = (A, β, ν, σ)
consisting of an environment and a learning rule.
Population dynamics. An initial state and a learning process uniquely determine a new state. To see this
note that since the number of messages M , and actions A are finite, whereas the population is a continuum,
the probability that an agent observes a message m and switches to an action a is equal to the fraction of
agents who observe a message m and switch to an action a. For this reason we say that the learning process
is deterministic, despite the fact that the choice of an individual agent may be stochastic.
Time is discrete in our model. Let fP : Γ→ Γ denote the mapping between states induced by a single step
of the learning process P . That is, fP (γˆ) is the new state induced by a single step of the process P , given
an initial state γˆ. Similarly, for each t > 1, let f tP (γˆ) denote the state induced after t steps of the learning
process P , given an initial state γˆ (e.g., f2P (γˆ) = fP (fP (γˆ)), f3P (γˆ) = fP (fP (fP (γˆ))), etc.).
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We say that γ∗ is a steady state with respect to the stationary learning process P , if it is a fixed point of
the induced mapping fP , i.e., if fP (γ∗) = γ∗.
Steady state γ∗ is a global attractor, if the population converges to γ∗from any initial state, i.e., if
limt−→∞f tP (γˆ) = γ∗ for all γˆ ∈ Γ.
L1-distance. We measure distances between probability distributions with the L1-distance (norm). Specif-
ically, let the L1-distance between two distributions of samples ψl,γ , ψl,γ′ ∈ ∆
(
Al
)
of size l, be defined as
follows:
‖ψl,γ − ψl,γ′‖1 =
∑
m∈Al |ψl,γ (m)− ψl,γ′ (m)| .
Similarly the L1-distance between two distributions of actions γ, γ′ ∈ ∆ (A) is defined as follows:
‖γ − γ′‖1 =
∑
a∈A
|γ (a)− γ′ (a)| .
We conclude this section by demonstrating how the model captures motivating Examples 1 and 3.
Example 1 (Competing Technologies revisited). The environment in which agents choose to adopt one of
two competing technologies with increasing returns is modeled by a learning process
P = ({a′, a′′} , β, ν, σ) ,
in which {a′, a′′} is the set of competing technologies, β ∈ (0, 1) is the share of new agents that
join the population in each round.The learning rule of the agent is defined as follows:
σ (−→a ) =

0.5 · a′ + 0.5 · a′′ −→a = ∅
a′ −→a ∈ {a′, (a′, a′, a′) , (a′′, a′, a′) , (a′, a′′, a′) , (a′, a′, a′′)}
a′′ otherwise.
The initial population state is given by γˆ (a′) = α. Finally the distribution of sample size is given
by:
Case I: ν (l) =
1% l = 099% l = 1 Case II: ν (l) =
1% l = 399% l = 1.
Observe that the mean sample size (µl) is equal to 0.99 in Case I, and is equal to 1.02 in Case II.
Example 3 (Rock-Paper-Scissors revisited) The environment in which agents play the rock-paper-scissors
game is modeled by a learning process
P = ({rock, paper, scissors} , β = 1, ν, σ) ,
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where the distribution of the sample size is given by
ν (l) =
0 1− p1 0,
the initial population state is given by γˆ. Finally, the learning rule is given by
σ (a) =

rock a = scissors
paper a = rock
scissors a = paper.
σ (∅) = γ′.
Observe that the expected number of actions is equal to p (i.e., µl = p).
4 Main Results
4.1 Upper Bound on the Distance between New States
Our first result shows that the distance between two new states is at most (1− β · (1− µl)) times the distance
between the two initial states. Formally,
Theorem 1. Let P = (A, β, ν, σ) be a stationary learning process, and let γ 6= γ′ ∈ Γ be two population states.
Then:
‖fP (γ)− fP (γ′)‖1 ≤ (1− β · (1− µl)) · ‖γ − γ′‖1 ,
with a strict inequality if there exists an l > 1 such that ν (l) > 0.
(Sketch of proof. Formal proof is presented for the more general result of Theorem 3.)
The distance between the final population states is bounded as follows:
‖(fP (γ))− (fP (γ′))‖1 ≤ β ·
∑
l∈N
ν (l) · ‖ψl,γ − ψl,γ′‖1 + (1− β) · ‖γ − γ′‖1 . (2)
The intuition of this inequality is as follows. The first part of the RHS of Eq. (2) reflects the actions played
by the β new agents. The social learning stage may induce different behaviors for new agents who observe
samples of size l only if they observe different samples. Thus, taking the weighted average of the distances
between samples yields the bound on how much the aggregate behaviors of the new agents may differ (i.e.,∑
l∈N ν (l) · ‖ψl,γ − ψl,γ′‖1). Finally, the mixed average of this expression and the behavior of the incumbents,
gives the total bound on the difference between the final population states.
Next, observe that the distance between distributions of samples is bounded by the sample size times the
distance between the distributions of actions:
‖ψl,γ − ψl,γ′‖1 ≤ l · ‖γ − γ′‖1 ,
with a strict inequality if l > 1. This is so because the event that two samples of size l differ is (a non-disjoint)
union of the l events: the first action in the samples differ, the second action in the simple differs, ..., the last
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lth action in the samples differ.
Substituting the second inequality in (2) yields:
‖(fP (γ))− (fP (γ′))‖1 ≤ β ·
∑
l∈N
ν (l) · l · ‖γ − γ′‖1 + (1− β) · ‖γ − γ′‖1 =
(
β ·
(∑
l∈N
ν (l) · l
)
+ (1− β)
)
· ‖γ − γ′‖ = (β · µl + 1− β) · ‖γ − γ′‖ = (1− β · (1− µl)) · ‖γ − γ′‖1 ,
with a strict inequality if there exists an l > 1 such that ν (l) > 0.
Observe that (1− β · (1− µl)) < 1 iff µl < 1. Recall that mapping f is a weak contraction (or shrinking)
if ‖(f (γ))− (f (γ′))‖ < ‖γ − γ′‖ for each γ 6= γ′. Theorem 1 implies that fP is a weak contraction mapping if
either (1) µl < 1, or (2) µl = 1 and6 ν (1) < 1. The fact that the mapping fP is a weak contraction mapping
implies that fp admits a global attractor.7 Formally:
Corollary 1. Let P = (A, β, ν, σ) be a stationary learning process satisfying (1) µl < 1, or (2) µl = 1 and
ν (1) < 1. Then fP is a weak contraction mapping, which implies that (1) fP admits a unique steady state γ∗,
and (2) this unique steady state γ∗ is a global attractor (i.e., limt−→∞f tP (γˆ) = γ∗ for each γˆ ∈ Γ).
4.2 Full Characterization of Environments that Admit Multiple Steady States
Our main result fully characterizes which environments admit learning rules for which the past casts a long
shadow. Specifically, it shows that an environment admits a learning rule with more than one multiple steady
state iff µ > 1 (alternatively if all agents sample exactly one action). In the opposite case (µ ≤ 1) each learning
rule admits a unique steady state, and, moreover, the population converges to the unique steady state from
any initial state. Formally:
Theorem 2. Let E = (A, β, ν) be an environment. The following two conditions are equivalent:
1. µl > 1, or ν (1) = 1.
2. There exists a learning rule σ, such that the learning process (E, σ) admits two different steady states.
Proof. Corollary 1 immediately implies that ¬1⇒¬2. We are left with the task of showing that 1⇒ 2.
Case A: Assume that ν (1) = 1 (i.e., each new agent in the population observes a single action). Consider
the learning rule in which each agent plays the action that he observed, i.e., σ∗ (a) = a. Let γ be an arbitrary
population state. Observe that γ is a steady state of the learning process (E, σ∗) because:
(fP (γ)) (a) = γ (a) .
Case B: Assume that µl > 1. Let a and a′ be different actions (a 6= a′ ∈ A). Let σ∗ be a learning rule
according to which each agent plays action a∗ if he has observed action a∗ at least once, and plays action a′
6Note that µl = 1 and ν (1) < 1 jointly imply that there exists l > 1 such that ν (l) > 0.
7See Pata (2014, Theorem 1.7) for a formal proof that any weak contraction mapping on a compact metric space admits a
global attractor (see also the sketch of the proof in Munkres, 2000, Section 28, Exercise 7). We thank Xiangqian Yang for kindly
referring us to these proofs.
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otherwise, that is,
σ∗
(
al
)
=
a∗ ∃i, s.t., ali = a∗a′ otherwise.
It is immediate that the population state in which all agents play action a′ (i.e., γ (a′) = 1 ) is a steady state
of the learning process (E, σ∗). We now show that there exists x > 0, such that the population state γx in
which all agents play action a∗ with probability x, and play action a′ with the remaining probability of 1− x
(i.e., γx (a∗) = x and γx (a′) = 1−x) is another steady state of the learning process (E, σ∗). Observe that the
state γx is consistent with the learning process (E, σ∗) if and only if
(fP (γx)) (a∗) =
∑
l∈supp(ν)
ν (l) · 1
|A|l
·
∑
~a∈Al
1(∃i s.t., ai=a∗) =
∑
l∈supp(ν)
ν (l) ·
∑
a;∈Al s.t.,
1− (1− x)l ≡ g (x) . (3)
In order to demonstrate the existence of multiple steady states we need to show that there is x∗ such
that g (x∗) = x∗. Observe that g (x) (defined in (3) above) is a continuous increasing function of x, and that
g (1) ≤ 1. Below we show that g (x) > x for x << 1, which implies by standard a continuity argument that
there is 0 < x∗ ≤ 1 such that g (x∗) = x∗ , and hence γx∗ is a steady state of the learning process (E, σ∗).
We conclude the proof by showing that g (x) > x for x << 1. Observe that when x << 1 is close to 0, then
1− (1− x)l can be (Taylor-)approximated by
1− (1− x)l = 1− (1− l · x+O (x2)) = l · x+O (x2) .
This implies that when x << 1, (fP (γx)) (a∗) can be approximated by:
(fP (γx)) (a∗) =
∑
l∈supp(νl)
ν (l) ·
∑
a;∈Al s.t.,∃i, s.t., al
i
=a∗
(
l · x+O (x2)) =
x ·
∑
l∈supp(νl)
ν (l) ·
∑
a;∈Al s.t.,∃i, s.t., al
i
=a∗
l +O
(
x2
)
= x · µl +O
(
x2
)
> x.
Remark 1. We note that the learning rules constructed in the proof above can be consistent with Bayesian
inference and best-replying in plausible environments. The learning rule in Case A (playing the observed action)
induces a Nash equilibrium in a setup with competing technologies with increasing returns and uncertainty
about the initial population state, such as the setup presented in Example 1.
The learning rule in Case B induces a Nash equilibrium in the following setup of two competing technologies
with uncertainty about their quality. There are two states of the world. In State 1 technology a∗ has a higher
quality, and in state 2 technology a′ has a higher quality. The technology with the higher quality yields a
payoff of one to an agent who follows it, and the technology with the lower quality yields a payoff of zero.
State 1 has a prior probability of 60%. In state 1, 10% of the agents follow technology a∗ in the first period,
and the remaining agents follow technology a. In state 2, all agents follow technology a′ in period one (i.e., the
setup has a payoff-determined initial popularity a` la Banerjee & Fudenberg, 2004). Observe that the unique
Nash equilibrium in this setup is for an agent to play a∗ when observing a∗ at least once (as in this case the
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agent knows for sure that action a∗ has a higher quality), and to play a′ otherwise (as in this case the posterior
probability that action a′ has a higher quality is at least 60%).
5 Heterogeneous Population
The basic model assumes that all agents share the same distribution of sample sizes, and the same learning
rule. In many applications the population might be heterogeneous, i.e., the population includes various groups
that differ in their sampling procedures and learning rules. A few examples of such models with heterogeneous
populations can be found in:
1. Ellison & Fudenberg (1993), who study competing technologies where each technology is better for some
of the players and these different tastes induce different learning rules (see also Munshi, 2004).
2. Young (1993b), who studies social learning in a bargaining model in which agents differ in the size of
their samples.
3. Heller & Mohlin (2017), who in a companion paper analyze community enforcement in which the popu-
lation includes several types of agents, and each type uses a different strategy.
5.1 Extended Model
In what follows we introduce heterogeneous populations that include different types, and we redefine the
notions of population state, environment, and learning process to deal with this heterogeneity.
Population state. Let Θ denote a finite set of types with a typical element θ. Let λθ denote the mass of
agents of type θ (or θ-agents). For simplicity, we assume that λ has full support. We redefine a population
state (or state for short) to be a vector γ = (γθ)θ∈Θ, where each γθ ∈ ∆ (A) denotes the aggregate distribution
of actions played by θ-agents. Let γ¯ ∈ ∆ (A) denote the average distribution of actions in the population (i.e.,
γ¯ (a) =
∑
θ λθγθ (a) for each action a ∈ A). A population state is uniform if all types play the same aggregate
distribution of actions, i.e., if γθ (a) = γ¯ (a) for each type θ ∈ Θ and action a ∈ A. We redefine Γ to denote
the set of all populations with heterogeneous types.
New/Revising agents. As in the basic model, in each period, a share of 0 < β ≤ 1 of the agents of each
type die and are replaced with new agents (or, alternatively, are randomly selected to reevaluate their choice),
while the remaining 1− β share of the agents of each type play the same action as they played in the past.
Sample. Each new agent observes a finite sequence of actions (or sample). The size of the sample observed
by type θ is a random variable with a distribution νθ ∈ ∆ (N). Let M , the set of all feasible samples, be
redefined as follows
M = ∪θ∈Θ ∪l∈supp(νθ) Al,
Let l¯ = maxl∈ (∪θ∈Θsupp (νθ)) < ∞ be the maximal sample size. For each sample size l ∈ N , let ψl : Γ →
∆
(
Al
)
denote the distribution of samples observed by each agent in the population (or sampling rule for short),
conditional on the sample having size l. A typical sample of size l is represented by the vector −→a = (a1, ..., al).
We analyze two kinds of sampling methods in heterogeneous populations:
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1. Observing different random agents: Each agent independently samples different agents, and observes a
random action played by each of these agents. This kind of sampling is a common modeling choice in
situations in which an agent’s payoff depends not on the behavior of a specific sub-group of opponents,
but on the agent’s own action, the state of nature, and, possibly, the aggregate behavior of the population
(see, e.g., Ellison & Fudenberg, 1995; Banerjee & Fudenberg, 2004). Formally, we define for each sample
size l ∈ N, each state γ ∈ Γ, and each sample (a1, ..., al),
ψl,γ (a1, ..., al) =
∏
1≤i≤l
γ¯ (ai) . (4)
2. Observing a single random type: Each agent randomly draws a type θ¯, and then the agent samples
different agents of type θ¯, and observes a random action played by each of these θ¯-agents. This kind of
observation is relevant to models in which the agent is randomly matched with an opponent, and may
sample some actions played in the past by agents with the same type as the opponent. Formally, we
define for each size l ∈ N, each state γ ∈ Γ, and each sample (a1, ..., al),
ψl,γ (a1, ..., al) =
∑
θ∈Θ
λθ ·
∏
1≤i≤l
γθ (ai) . (5)
In the case of β = 1, this sampling method has another interpretation that is common in models of
strategic interactions among randomly matched agents (e.g., Rosenthal, 1979; Nowak & Sigmund, 1998;
Heller & Mohlin, 2017). According to this interpretation, each agent is involved in n ≥ l¯ interactions
in each period. In each of these interactions the agent is randomly matched with a different opponent,
and the agent observes a sample of random actions played by the opponent in the previous round. The
random type of the opponent is distributed according to λθ, and each of the actions played by the
opponent of type θ in the previous round is distributed according to γθ.
Observe that both cases, i.e., (4) and (5), coincide in two special setups: (1) when the population state is
uniform (as in the basic model), or (2) when agents observe at most one action (i.e., l¯ = 1).
Remark 2. All our results work also in a setup in which some types use the first sampling method (i.e.,
observing different random agents), while other types use the second sampling method (i.e., observing a single
random type).
Environment. We redefine an environment as a tuple
E =
(
A,Θ, β, ψl, (λθ, νθ)θ∈Θ
)
that includes the six components described above: a finite set of actions A, a finite set of types Θ, a fraction
of new agents at each stage β, a sampling rule ψl (satisfying either (4) or (5)), a distribution over the set of
types λ, and a profile of distributions of sample sizes (νθ)θ∈Θ.
Given environment E =
(
A,Θ, β, ψl, (λθ, νθ)θ∈Θ
)
, let µl, themean sample size, be redefined as the expected
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number of actions observed by a random agent in the population. Formally:
µl =
∑
θ∈Θ
λθ
∑
l∈supp(νθ)
νθ (l) · l.
Learning rule and stationary learning process. Each new θ-agent chooses his action in the new pop-
ulation state by following a stationary (i.e., time-independent) learning rule σθ : M → ∆ (A). That is, a new
θ-agent who observes sample m ∈M plays action a with probability σθ,m (a) . The remaining 1−β incumbent
agents play the same action as in the previous round. A profile of learning rules (σθ)θ∈Θ is uniform if all types
use the same learning rule, i.e., if σθ = σθ′ for each type θ, θ′ ∈ Θ.
A stationary learning process (or learning process for short) is a pair
P =
(
E, (σθ)θ∈Θ
)
=
(
A,Θ, β, ψl, (λθ, νθ, σθ)θ∈Θ
)
,
consisting of an environment and a learning rule.
As in the basic model, let fP : Γ → Γ denote the mapping between states induced by a single step of the
learning process P .
L1-distance. Each population state γ ∈ Γ corresponds to a distribution qγ ∈ (Θ×A) as follows: qγ (θ, a) =
λθ · γθ (a). We define the distance between two population states γ, γ′ ∈ Γ as the L1-distance between the
corresponding distributions qγ , qγ; ∈ (Θ×A):
‖γ − γ′‖1 = ‖qγ − qγ′‖1 =
∑
θ∈Θ
∑
a∈A
|λθ · γθ (a)− λθ · γ′θ (a)| =
∑
θ∈Θ
λθ · ‖γθ − γ′θ‖1 .
We demonstrate how the extended model formalizes the motivating Example 3, in which there are two
types that differ in their sample sizes.
Example. 2 (Indirect Reciprocity revisited). The environment in which agents play the Prisoner’s Dilemma
and use rules representing indirect reciprocity is modeled by a learning process
P =
({c, d} ,Θ = {θ′, θ′′} , β = 1, ψl, (λθ, νθ, σθ)θ∈Θ)
in which A = {c, d} is the set of actions in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, all agents revise their actions in each
round (i.e., β = 1), and ψl is given by Eq. (5). The distribution of type is λθ′ = 99% and λθ′′ = 1%. The
distribution of the sample size of each type is as follows: νθ′ ≡ 1, and νθ′ ≡ 0 in Case A and νθ′ ≡ 3 in Case
B. The initial population state is given by γˆθ′ = α1 · d+ (1− α1) · c and γˆθ′′ = α2 · d+ (1− α2) · c. Finally, the
profile of learning rules is as follows: σθ′ (a) = a, and σθ′′ (∅) = α2 · c+ (1− α2) · d in Case A, and
σθ′′ (−→a ) =
c
−→a ∈ {(c, c, c) , (c, c, d) , (c, d, c) , (d, c, c)}
d otherwise
in Case B. Observe that the expected number of actions is equal to 0.99 in Case A (µl = 0.99), and µl = 1.02
in Case B.
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5.2 Generalizing the Main Results for Heterogeneous Populations
Our next result generalizes Theorem 1 to heterogeneous populations. It shows that the distance between two
new states is at most (1− β · (1− µl)) times the distance between the two initial states. Formally,
Theorem 3. (Generalization of Theorem 1) Let P =
(
A,Θ, β, ψl, (λθ, νθ, σθ)θ∈Θ
)
be a stationary learning
process, and let γ 6= γ′ ∈ Γ be two population states. Then:
‖fP (γ)− fP (γ′)‖1 ≤ (1− β · (1− µl)) · ‖γ − γ′‖1 ,
with a strict inequality if there exist a type θ and an l > 1 such that νθ (l) > 0.
The intuition is similar to Theorem 1. The proof is presented in Appendix A.
Similarly to Section 4, Theorem 1 implies that fP admits a global attractor if either (1) µl < 1, or (2)
µl = 1 and there is a type θ ∈ Θ such that νθ (1) < 1. Formally:
Corollary 2. Let P =
(
A,Θ, β, ψl, (λθ, νθ, σθ)θ∈Θ
)
be a stationary learning process satisfying (1) µl < 1, or
(2) µl = 1 and there is a type θ ∈ Θ such that8 νθ (1) < 1. Then fP is a weak contraction mapping, which
implies that (1) fP admits a unique steady state γ∗, and (2) this unique steady state γ∗ is a global attractor
(i.e., limt−→∞f tP (γˆ) = γ∗ for each γˆ ∈ Γ).
The following result generalizes Theorem 2 to the setup of heterogeneous populations. The proof is analo-
gous to the proof of Theorem 2 and is omitted for brevity.
Theorem 4. (Generalization of Theorem 2) Let E =
(
A,Θ, β, ψl, (λθ, νθ)θ∈Θ
)
be an environment. The
following two conditions are equivalent:
1. µl > 1, or νθ (1) = 1 for each type θ ∈ Θ.
2. There exists a profile of learning rules (σθ)θ∈Θ, such that the learning process
(
E, (σθ)θ∈Θ
)
admits two
different steady states.
6 Non-Stationary Learning Process and Common Shocks
6.1 The Non-Stationary Process
In this section we adapt the model of Section 5 to deal with non-stationary deterministic learning processes,
in which the process explicitly depends on calendar time. We extend our results to this setup.
Adaptations to the model. For each period t ≥ 1, let βt ∈ [0, 1] denote the random share of agents who
revise their actions in period t. For each type θ ∈ Θ and period t ≥ 1, let νtθ ∈ ∆ (N) denote the distribution
of sample sizes of type θ in period t. To simplify the notation we assume that the support of the sample sizes
of each type is independent of the period, i.e., supp
(
νt1θ
)
= supp
(
νt2θ
)
:= supp (νθ) for each type θ ∈ Θ and
8Note that µl = 1 and the existence of a type θ ∈ Θ such that νθ (1) < 1, implies that there is a type θ ∈ Θ and an l > 1 such
that νθ (l) > 0
15
periods t1, t2 ≥ 1. As in the basic model, let M denote the set of all feasible sample sizes. A non-stationary
environment is a tuple
E =
(
A,Θ, (βt)t∈N , ψl, (λθ)θ∈Θ ,
(
νtθ
)
θ∈Θ,t≥1
)
.
Given a non-stationary environment, let µtl denote the expected number of actions observed in period t, i.e.,
µtl =
∑
θ∈Θ λθ
∑
l∈supp(νθ) ν
t
θ (l) · l.
Given a non-stationary environment E, let µ¯l be the upper limit of the geometric mean of 1− βt · (1− µtl)
as t goes to to infinity, i.e.,
µ¯l = limsuptˆ→∞ tˆ
√∏
t≤t0
(1− βt · (1− µtl)).
For each type θ ∈ Θ and period t ≥ 1, let σtθ : M → ∆ (A) denote the non-stationary learning rule of new
θ-agents in period t. A non-stationary learning process is a pair consisting of a non-stationary environment
and a non-stationary learning rule, i.e.,
P =
(
E,
(
σtθ
)
θ∈Θ,t≥1
)
=
(
A,Θ, (βt)t≥1 , ψl, (λθ)θ∈Θ ,
(
νtθ, σ
t
θ
)
θ∈Θ,t≥1
)
.
As as in the basic model, a non-stationary learning process P and an initial state uniquely determine a new
state in each period t. Let f tp (γˆ) ∈ Γ denote the state induced after t stages of the non-stationary learning
process P .
A sequence of states (γ∗t )t∈N is a global attractor of the non-stationary learning process P , if
limt−→∞
∥∥f tP (γˆ)− γ∗t ∥∥1 = 0
for each initial state γˆ ∈ Γ.
Adapted results. Minor adaptations to the proof of Theorem 3 and a simple inductive argument imme-
diately imply that the distance between two states at time to is at most
∏
t≤t0 (1− βt · (1− µtl)) the initial
distance. Formally:
Corollary 3. Let P =
(
A,Θ, (βt)t≥1 , ψl, (λθ)θ∈Θ , (νtθ, σtθ)θ∈Θ,t≥1
)
be a non-stationary learning process, let
γˆ, γˆ′ ∈ Γ be two population states, and let tˆ ≥ 1. Then:∥∥∥f tˆp (γˆ)− f tˆp (γˆ′)∥∥∥1 ≤ ‖γˆ − γˆ′‖1 ·∏
t≤tˆ
(
1− βt · (1− µtl)) ·
This, in turn, immediately implies that in any non-stationary environment in which µ¯l < 1, any profile of
non-stationary learning rules admits a global attractor. Formally:
Corollary 4. Let E =
(
A,Θ, (βt)t≥1 , ψl, (λθ)θ∈Θ , (νtθ)θ∈Θ,t≥1
)
be a non-stationary environment satisfying
µ¯l < 1. Then for any profile of non-stationary learning rules (σtθ)θ∈Θ,t≥1, the non-stationary learning process
P =
(
E, (σtθ)θ∈Θ,t≥1
)
admits a global attractor.
The example presented in Case A of the proof of Theorem 2 demonstrates that the above bound of µ¯l < 1
is binding in the sense that there is an environment with µ¯l = 1 that admits a profile of learning rules with
multiple steady states.
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6.2 Process with Common Shocks
In this section we further extend our model to deal also with common stochastic shocks to the learning rules,
and we extend our results to this setup.
Additional adaptations to the model. In what follows we further adapt the model of Section 6.1 by
allowing common stochastic shocks to the learning rules of the agents.
Let (Ω,F , p) be an arbitrary probability space. Each element ω ∈ Ω represents the state of nature, which
determines the realizations of all common shocks to the learning rules in all periods. For each type θ ∈ Θ
and period t ∈ N, let σtθ : Ω × M → ∆ (A) denote the state-dependent learning rule of new θ-agents in
period t (which also depends on the state of nature). A learning process with common shocks is a pair
consisting of a non-stationary environment and a state-dependent learning rule, i.e., P =
(
E, (σtθ)θ∈Θ,t≥1
)
=(
A,Θ, (βt)t≥1 , ψl, (λθ)θ∈Θ , (νtθ, σtθ)θ∈Θ,t≥1
)
.
Learning processes with commons shocks are important in modeling situations in which there are stochastic
factors that influence the learning rules of all new agents in period t. For example , Ellison & Fudenberg (1995)
model a situation in which new agents in period t choose between two agricultural technologies, and each such
new agent observes a noisy signal about the expected payoff of each technology conditional on the weather in
period t (which is common to all agents), where the (unknown) state of nature determines the weather in all
periods.
The state of nature, the learning process, and the initial population state uniquely determine the population
state in each period. Let f tp (ω) (γˆ) ∈ Γ denote the population state induced after t stages of the non-stationary
learning process P , given an initial population state γˆ, and state of nature ω ∈ Ω.
We say that a sequence of state-dependent population states (γ∗t )t≥1, where γ∗t : Ω→ Γ, is a state-dependent
global attractor of the learning process with commons shocks P if, for each ω ∈ Ω, limt−→∞f tP (ω) (γˆ) = γ∗t (ω)
for each initial state γˆ ∈ Γ.
Example 4 below demonstrates how to apply the extended model to a social learning process with competing
technologies with common shocks:
Example 4 (Competing Technologies with Common Shocks). Consider a stochastic environment in which
there are two possible regimes {1, 2}. There are two technologies: a1 and a2. Technology a1 is advantageous
in regime 1, while technology a2 is advantageous in regime 2. There is a uniform common prior about the
regime in round 1. In each subsequent round, the regime is the same as in the previous round with probability
99%, and it is a new regime with probability 1%. In each round, a share of 25% of the incumbents die,
and are replaced with new agents. Each new agent observes the action of a single random incumbent and
a noisy signal about the current regime, and based on these observations, the agent chooses one of the two
technologies. Assume that the learning rule used by the agents implies that each new agent plays action a1:
1. with a probability of 95% after observing action a1 in regime 1;
2. with a probability of 80% after observing action a1 in regime 2;
3. with a probability of 20% after observing action a2 in regime 1;
4. with a probability of 5% after observing action a2 in regime 2.
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One can show that the environment admits a unique steady state that is a state-dependent global attractor.
The induced aggregate behavior of the population converges towards playing action a1 with an average prob-
ability of 80% in regime 1, and it converges towards playing action a1 with an average probability of 20% in
regime 2.
This learning process with common shocks is modeled as
P =
(
{a1, a2} , {θ} , (βt ≡ 25%)t∈N , ψl, λθ,
(
νtθ ≡ 1, σtθ
)
t≥1
)
.
The set of states of nature Ω =
{
(ωn)n∈N
}
is the set of infinite binary sequences, where each ωn ∈ {1, 2}
describes the regime in round n. The definition of (F , p) is derived from the Markovian process determining
the regime in each round in a standard way. Given state ω = (ωn)n∈N , let the learning rule be defined as
follows:
σθ (a1, ω) =

95% a = a1 and ωt = 1
80% a = a1 and ωt = 2
20% a = a2 and ωt = 1
5% a = a2 and ωt = 2.
Adapted Results. Minor adaptations to the proof of Theorem 3 and a simple inductive argument imme-
diately imply that the distance between two states at time tˆ is at most
∏
t≤tˆ (1− βt · (1− µtl)) the initial
distance. Formally:
Corollary 5. Let P =
(
A,Θ, (βt)t≥1 , ψl, (λθ)θ∈Θ , (νtθ, σtθ)θ∈Θ,t≥1
)
be a learning process with commons shocks,
let γˆ, γˆ′ ∈ Γ be two population states, and let tˆ ∈ N. Then, for each ω ∈ Ω,∥∥∥f tˆp (ω) (γˆ)− f tˆp (ω) (γˆ′)∥∥∥1 ≤ ‖γˆ − γˆ′‖1 · ∏
t≤t0
(
1− βt · (1− µtl)) ·
An immediate corollary of Corollary 5 is that any environment with common shocks in which µ¯l < 1, given
any profile of learning rules, admits a stochastic global attractor. That is, in the long run, the population’s
behavior depends only on the state of nature, but it is independent of the initial population state in time zero.
Formally:
Corollary 6. Let E =
(
A,Θ, (βt)t≥1 , ψl, (λθ)θ∈Θ , (νtθ)θ∈Θ,t≥1
)
be an environment satisfying µ¯l < 1. Then for
any profile of stochastic learning rules (σtθ)θ∈Θ,t≥1, the learning process with common shocks P =
(
E, (σtθ)θ∈Θ,t≥1
)
admits a global stochastic attractor.
7 Responsiveness and Effective Sample Size
Our results so far have not assumed anything about the agents’ learning rules. Obviously, additional infor-
mation on the profile of learning rules, may allow us to achieve stronger results. In this section, we present
simple notions of responsiveness and expected effective sample size, and use them to derive a tighter upper
bound for processes that admit global attractors.
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7.1 Additional Definitions
Fix a stationary learning process P =
(
A,Θ, β, ψl, (λθ, νθ, σθ)θ∈Θ
)
. For each type θ, each sample size l ∈
supp (ν), and each action a ∈ A , let σθ,l (a) (σθ,l (a)) be the minimal (maximal) probability that learning rule
σ assigns to action a after observing a sample of size l, i.e.,
σθ,l (a) = minm∈Alσθ,m (a) (σθ,l (a) = maxm∈Alσθ,m (a) ) .
Let rθ,l denote the maximal responsiveness of new θ-agents to changes in observed samples of size l, which
is defined as follows:
rθ,l = min
(
1, 12 ·
∑
a∈A
(
σθ,l (a)− σθ,l (a)
))
, (6)
and let rθ,0 = 0. The responsiveness effectively limits the maximal influence of different samples of length l
on the behavior of θ-agents to be at most rθ,l ≤ 1. Observe that when there are two actions (i.e., A = {a, b}),
then rθ,l is simply the difference between the maximal and minimal probability assigned to each action, i.e.,
rθ,l = σθ,l (a)− σθ,l (a) = σθ,l (b)− σθ,l (b) (A = {a, b}) . (7)
When there are more than two actions, 12 ·
∑
a∈A
(
σθ,l (a)− σθ,l (a)
)
may be larger than one. We bound rθ,l
from above by one in Eq.(6) because, any change of sample cannot affect an agent’s mixed behavior by more
than one (as measured by the L1-distance over the set of mixed actions).
We call the product of the sample size and the responsiveness, rθ,l · l the effective sample size. For each
type θ, let µeθ ∈ R+denote the expected effective sample size of θ-agents, i.e.,
µeθ =
∑
l∈supp(νθ)
νθ (l) · rθ,l · l.
Finally, let µ ∈ R+denote the effective sample size in the population, i.e.,
µel =
∑
θ∈Θ
λθ · µeθ.
It is immediate that the effective sample size is always weakly smaller than the expected sample size in the
population; i.e., µel ≤ µl for each stationary learning process s P =
(
A,Θ, β, ψl, (λθ, νθ, σθ)θ∈Θ
)
.
7.2 A Tighter Bound on the Distance between New States
Our main result in this section shows that the distance between two new states is at most (1− β · (1− µel ))
times the distance between the two initial states. This bound is tighter than the one presented in Theorem 1,
as we replace expected sample size µl with the (weakly) smaller effective sample size µel . Formally,
Theorem 5. Let P =
(
A,Θ, β, ψl, (λθ, νθ, σθ)θ∈Θ
)
be a stationary learning process, and let γ 6= γ′ ∈ Γ be two
population states. Then:
‖fP (γ)− fP (γ′)‖1 ≤ (1− β · (1− µel )) · ‖γ − γ′‖1 ,
where the inequality is strict if there exist a type θ and an l > 1 such that νθ (l) > 0.
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Proof. The key step of the proof is to show the following inequality:
‖(fP (γ))− (fP (γ′))‖1 ≤ β ·
∑
θ∈Θ
λθ ·
∑
l∈N
νθ (l) · rθ,l · ‖ψl,γ − ψl,γ′‖1 + (1− β) · ‖γ − γ′‖1 . (8)
Inequality (8) is the same as (2) in the proof of Theorem 1, except for the factor of rθ,l ≤ 1 on the RHS. All
other arguments of the proof of Theorem 1 remain the same. We prove (8) in Lemma 6 in Appendix B.
Observe that (1− β · (1− µel )) < 1 iff µel < 1, and in this case fP is a contraction mapping, which implies
that fP admits a global attractor. This allows us to strengthen Corollary 1 as follows.
Corollary 7. Let P =
(
A,Θ, β, ψl, (λθ, νθ, σθ)θ∈Θ
)
be a learning process satisfying (1) µel < 1, or (2) µel = 1
and there is a type θ ∈ Θ such that νθ (1) < 1. Then fP is a contraction mapping, which implies that (1) fP
admits a unique steady state γ∗, and (2) this unique steady state γ∗ is a global attractor (i.e., limt−→∞f tP (γˆ) =
γ∗ for each γˆ ∈ Γ).
We demonstrate the implications of Corollary 7 by revisiting Example 1.
Example. 1 (Competing Technologies revisited). Recall, that each agent observes a single action, which
implies that the expected number of observed actions is one (i.e., µl = 1). Hence the results of the previous
sections do not imply the that the learning process admits a unique steady state. To simplify notation, assume
that α > α. Observe that the effective number of observations, µel , is equal to:
µel = µeθ = rθ,l=1 · 1 =
1
2 ·
∑
a∈A
(
σθ,l (a)− σθ,l (a)
)
= 12 · ((α− α) + ((1− α)− (1− α))) = α− α,
which is strictly less than one if α < 1 or α > 0. Corollary 7 implies that the learning process converges to a
global attractor (which is the unique steady state) whenever α < 1 or α > 0.
Our final result demonstrates that our bound of the effective sample size being less than one is tight.
Specifically, it shows that given any environment in which the expected sample size µl > 1, and any number
1 < y ≤ µl, there is a learning rule with an effective sample size of µel = y with multiple steady states.
Formally:
Proposition 1. Let E =
(
A,Θ, β, ψl, (λθ, νθ)θ∈Θ
)
be an environment satisfying µl > 1. Let 1 < y ≤ µl. Then
there exists a profile of learning rules (σθ)θ∈Θ, such that the learning process
(
E, (σθ)θ∈Θ
)
admits two different
steady states, and satisfies µel = y.
Proof. Let a and a′ be different actions (a 6= a′ ∈ A). Let (σ∗θ)θ∈Θ be a uniform learning process according to
which each agent plays action a∗ with a probability of yµl if he has observed action a
∗ at least once, and plays
action a′ otherwise, that is,
σ∗θ
(
al
)
=

y
µl
· a∗ +
(
1− xµl
)
· a′ if ∃i, s.t., ali = a∗
a′ otherwise.
Observe that the responsiveness of
(
E, (σ∗θ)θ∈Θ
)
is equal to x because:
µel =
∑
θ∈Θ
λθ · µeθ =
∑
θ∈Θ
λθ ·
∑
l∈supp(νθ)
νθ (l) · rθ,l · l =
∑
θ∈Θ
λθ ·
∑
l∈supp(νθ)
νθ (l) · 12 ·
∑
a∈A
(
σθ,l (a)− σθ,l (a)
) · l =
20
∑
θ∈Θ
λθ ·
∑
l∈supp(νθ)
νθ (l) · 12 ·
((
y
µl
− 0
)
+
(
1−
(
1− y
µl
)
+ 0 + ...+ 0
))
· l =
∑
θ∈Θ
λθ ·
∑
l∈supp(νθ)
νθ (l) · y
µl
· l = y
µl
·
∑
θ∈Θ
λθ ·
∑
l∈supp(νθ)
νθ (l) · l = y
µl
· µl = y.
It is immediate that the uniform population state in which all agents play action a′ (i.e., γθ (a′) = 1 for each
type θ ∈ Θ) is a steady state of the learning process (E, (σ∗θ)θ∈Θ). An analogous argument to the one presented
in Case B of the proof of Theorem 2 shows that there exists x > 0 such that the uniform population state
γx in which all agents play action a∗ with probability x, and play action a′ with the remaining probability of
1− x, is another steady state of the learning process (E, (σ∗θ)θ∈Θ).
8 Concluding Remarks
Repeated Interactions without Calendar Time. In many real-life situations agents are randomly
matched within a community, and these interactions have been going on since time immemorial. Modelling
such situations as repeated games with a definite starting point and strategies that can be conditioned on
calendar time may be a problematic modelling choice, as it seems implausible that agents would be aware of
the the exact time that has transpired since the starting point, and aware of the very distant history of play of
other agents. An alternative approach, is to model behavior in such situations as steady states of environments
without a calendar time (see, e.g., (Rosenthal, 1979; Okuno-Fujiwara & Postlewaite, 1995; Heller & Mohlin,
2017), and the working paper version of Phelan & Skrzypacz, 2006).
An interesting question about such environments is whether the distribution of strategies used by the
players to choose their actions as a function of their observations is sufficient to uniquely determine the steady
states, or whether the same distribution of rules may admit multiple steady states. Our main result shows that
the former is true whenever the expected number of observed actions is less than one, while if the expected
number of observed actions is more than one, then there is always a distribution of rules with multiple steady
states.
Multiple Locally Stable Steady States. Recall that steady state γ∗ is locally (asymptotically) stable
if a population starting from any sufficiently close initial state converges to γ∗. Our main result (Theorem
2) shows that an environment admits a profile of learning rules with multiple steady states if and only if
µl ≤ 1 and some agents sometimes observe more than one action. The construction we present to demonstrate
the existence of a learning rule with multiple steady states for any environment in which µl > 1 has one
unappealing property. The construction shows that both γ0 (the state in which everyone plays action a′) and
γx for some x > 0 (the state in which agents on average play action a∗ with a probability of x, and play action
a′ otherwise) are steady states. However, one can see that state γx is locally stable. By contrast, any small
perturbation in the population’s state will move the population away from γ0 (and towards γx).
An interesting problem, which we leave for future research, is to characterize necessary and sufficient
conditions for when an environment admits a learning rule with multiple locally stable states. Preliminary
analysis suggests that the expected number of observations might have to be significantly above 1 to allow
multiple locally stable steady states. In particular, for environments in which each agent chooses between two
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actions, it can be shown that: (1) when agents observe at most two actions, at most one steady state is locally
stable, and (2) when agents observe 3 actions with probability p and no actions otherwise, the environment
may admit multiple locally stable steady states only if p ≥ 23 (i.e., if µl = 3 · p ≥ 2).
Large Finite Populations. Our model studies infinite populations, and it is important to know what are
the implications of our results for large finite populations. The key difference between an infinite and a finite
population, is that in the former, the law of large numbers implies that the new state of the population is a
deterministic function of the initial state and the learning rule (assuming that the environment does not have
common stochastic shocks). By contrast, in finite populations the new population state is a random variable.
If the finite population is sufficiently large then we expect the resulting stochastic process to be close to the
deterministic process over finite time horizons. However, when time goes to infinity, rare random events will
occasionally take the population away from one (locally stable) steady state towards another steady state.9
When dealing with finite large populations, one should therefore interpret our main result (Theorem 2) as
follows. In environments in which µl < 1, all learning processes admit a unique globally stable state γ∗. The
population will quickly converge to state γ∗, and will almost always remain very close to this state. A rare
event in which the realized observations of many agents substantially differ from their expected values, may
take the population temporarily away from γ∗, but with a very high probability the population will quickly
converge back to γ∗.
In environments in which µl > 1, there are learning rules that admit multiple steady states. The fact that
the population is finite and that the new population state is a random variable will typically quickly take the
population away from steady states that are not locally stable. If the environment admits multiple locally
stable steady states, then the initial state will determine which of these locally stable states the population
will converge to in the medium run. Moreover the process will likely stay there for a significant amount of
time.
The literature on stochastic evolutionary game theory (starting with the pioneering works of Foster &
Young, 1990; Kandori et al., 1993; Young, 1993a; see Young, 2015, for a recent survey) studies situations the
long-run behavior in environments with multiple locally stable steady states, and in which there is a small
level of noise in the agents’ behavior. We think that it would be interesting to extend the methodology of this
literature in order to apply it to the setup analyzed in this paper. It might be that such future research can
characterize various cases in which, if the population size is sufficiently large, in the long run the population
will spend almost all of the time in one of these locally stable states.
Observations of Action Profiles. In Heller & Mohlin (2017) we investigate environments in which an agent
may observe action profiles played in past interactions between his current opponent and her past opponents.
All of our results can be extended to this setup, with relatively minor adjustments to the proofs. Specifically
one should count an observation of an action profile (in a two-player game) as two actions when calculating
the expected number of observed actions µl. Our main result still holds in this setup: an environment admits
a profile of learning rules with multiple steady states, essentially, if and only if µl ≤ 1.
9For a textbook overview of the deterministic approximation of stochastic evolutionary process we refer to Sandholm (2011).
22
A Proof of Theorem 3
The distance between the final population states is bounded as follows (where the second inequality is strict
if νθ (l) > 0 for some θ ∈ Θ and l ≥ 2):
‖(fP (γ))θ − (fP (γ′))θ‖1 ≤ β ·
∑
θ∈Θ
λθ ·
∑
l∈N
νθ (l) · ‖ψl,γ − ψl,γ′‖1 + (1− β) · ‖γ − γ′‖1 ≤
β ·
∑
θ∈Θ
λθ ·
∑
l∈N
νθ (l) · l · ‖γ − γ′‖1 + (1− β) · ‖γ − γ′‖1 =
(
β ·
(∑
θ∈Θ
λθ ·
∑
l∈N
νθ (l) · l
)
+ (1− β)
)
· ‖γ − γ′‖ = (β · µL + 1− β) · ‖γ − γ′‖ = (1− β · (1− µl)) · ‖γ − γ′‖1 .
The first inequality is proven in Lemma 1. The second inequality (is strict if νθ (l) > 0 for some θ ∈ Θ and
l ≥ 2) is implied by the inequality
‖ψl,γ − ψl,γ′‖1 ≤ l · ‖γ − γ′‖1 (with a strict inequality if l ≥ 2),
which is proven in Lemma 4.
Proofs of the various Lemmas used in the Proof of Theorem 3
Lemma 1. For each learning environment E and states γ 6= γ′ ∈ Γ,
‖(fP (γ))− (fP (γ′))‖1 ≤ β ·
∑
θ∈Θ
λθ ·
∑
l∈N
νθ (l) · ‖ψl,γ − ψl,γ′‖1 + (1− β) · ‖γ − γ′‖1 .
Proof.
‖(fP (γ))− (fP (γ′))‖1 =
∑
θ∈Θ
λθ · ‖(fP (γ))θ − (fP (γ′))θ‖1 ≤
∑
θ∈Θ
λθ ·
(
β ·
∑
l∈N
νθ (l) · ‖ψl,γ − ψl,γ′‖1 + (1− β) · ‖γθ − γ′θ‖1
)
=
β ·
∑
θ∈Θ
λθ ·
∑
l∈N
νθ (l) · ‖ψl,γ − ψl,γ′‖1 + (1− β) ·
∑
θ∈Θ
λθ · ‖γθ − γ′θ′‖1 =
β ·
∑
θ∈Θ
λθ ·
∑
l∈N
νθ (l) · ‖ψl,γ − ψl,γ′‖1 + (1− β) · ‖γ − γ′‖1 ,
where the inequality is due to Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. For each social learning environment E, type θ ∈ Θ, and each two states γ 6= γ′ ∈ Γ:
‖(fP (γ))θ − (fP (γ′))θ‖1 ≤ β ·
∑
l∈N
νθ (l) · ‖ψl,γ − ψl,γ′‖1 + (1− β) · ‖γθ − γ′θ‖1 .
Proof.
‖(fP (γ))θ − (fP (γ′))θ‖1 =
∑
a∈A
|(fP (γ))θ (a)− (fP (γ′))θ (a)| =
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∑
a∈A
∣∣∣∣∣∣
 ∑
l∈supp(νθ)
β · νθ (l)
∑
m∈Al
ψl,γ (m) · σθ,m + (1− β) · γθ
 (a)
−
β · ∑
l∈supp(νθ)
νθ (l) ·
∑
m∈Al
ψl,γ′ (m) · σθ,m + (1− β) · γ′θ
 (a)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ =
∑
a∈A
∣∣∣∣∣∣β ·
∑
l∈supp(νθ)
νθ (l) ·
∑
m∈Al
(ψl,γ (m)− ψl,γ′ (m)) · σθ,m (a) + (1− β) · (γθ (a)− γ′θ (a))
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ (9)
∑
a∈A
β · ∑
l∈supp(νθ)
νθ (l) ·
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
m∈Al
(ψl,γ (m)− ψl,γ′ (m)) · σθ,m (a)
∣∣∣∣∣∣+ (1− β) · |γθ (a)− γ′θ (a)|
 =
β ·
∑
l∈supp(νθ)
νθ (l) ·
∑
a∈A
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
m∈Al
(ψl,γ (m)− ψl,γ′ (m)) · σθ,m (a)
∣∣∣∣∣∣+ (1− β) ·
∑
a∈A
|γθ (a)− γ′θ (a)| ≤ (10)
β ·
∑
l∈supp(νθ)
νθ (l) · ‖ψl,γ − ψl,γ′‖1 + (1− β) · ‖γθ − γ′θ′‖1 ,
where the (9) is a triangle inequality, and (10) is due to Lemma 3.
Lemma 3. For each social learning environment E, each size l ∈ N, each type θ ∈ Θ, and any two states
γ 6= γ′ ∈ Γ:
∑
a∈A
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
m∈Al
(ψl,γ (m)− ψl,γ′ (m)) · σθ,m (a)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ‖ψl,γ − ψl,γ′‖1 .
Proof.
∑
a∈A
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
m∈Al
(ψl,γ (m)− ψl,γ′ (m)) · σθ,m (a)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∑
a∈A
∑
m∈Al
|ψl,γ (m)− ψl,γ′ (m)| · σθ,m (a)
=
∑
m∈Al
|ψl,γ (m)− ψl,γ′ (m)| ·
∑
a∈A
σθ,m (a)
=
∑
m∈Al
|ψl,γ (m)− ψl,γ′ (m)| · 1,
where the inequality is a triangle inequality.
Lemma 4. For each social learning environment E, type θ ∈ Θ, sample size l ∈ N, and states γ 6= γ′ ∈ Γ
‖ψl,γ − ψl,γ′‖1 ≤ l · ‖γ − γ′‖1 ,
with a strict inequality if l > 1.
Proof. Case I - Observing different random agents:
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‖ψl,γ − ψl,γ′‖1 =
∑
−→a ∈Al
|ψl,γ (−→a )− ψl,γ′ (−→a )| = (11)
∑
−→a ∈Al
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∏
1≤i≤l
γ¯ (ai)−
∏
1≤i≤l
γ¯′ (ai)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = (12)
∑
−→a ∈Al
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
1≤i≤l
(γ¯ (ai)− γ¯′ (ai)) ·
∏
i<j≤l
γ¯ (aj) ·
∏
1≤k<i
γ¯′ (ak)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ (< if l > 1) (13)
∑
−→a ∈Al
 ∑
1≤i≤l
|γ¯ (ai)− γ¯′ (ai)| ·
∏
i<j≤l
γ¯ (aj) ·
∏
1≤k<i
γ¯′ (ak)
 =
∑
1≤i≤l
 ∑
−→a ∈Al
|γ¯ (ai)− γ¯′ (ai)| ·
∏
i<j≤l
γ¯ (aj) ·
∏
1≤k<i
γ¯′ (ak)
 =
∑
1≤i≤l
(∑
ai∈A
|γ¯ (ai)− γ¯′ (ai)|
)
·
 ∑
(ai+1,...,al)∈Al−i
∏
i<j≤l
γ¯ (aj)
 ·
 ∑
(a1,...,ai−1)∈Ai−1
∏
1≤k<i
γ¯′ (ak)
 = (14)
∑
1≤i≤l
(∑
ai∈A
|γ¯ (ai)− γ¯′ (ai)|
)
· 1 · 1 =
∑
1≤i≤l
(‖γ¯ − γ¯′‖1) = l · ‖γ¯ − γ¯′‖1 ≤ l · ‖γ − γ′‖ .
Eq. (11) is due to the independence of different observations. Eq. (12) is implied by adding to the sum
elements that cancel out. Specifically, let bi = γ¯ (ai) and ci = γ¯′ (ai); then due to a “telescoping series”
argument (in which each new element appears once with a positive sign and once with a negative sign):10
∏
1≤i≤l
γ¯ (ai)−
∏
1≤i≤l
γ¯′ (ai) =
∏
1≤i≤l
bi −
∏
1≤i≤l
ci =
(b1 · ... · bl − c1 · b2 · ... · bl) + (c1 · b2 · ... · bl + c1 · c2 · b3 · ... · bl)− c1 · c2 · b3 · ... · bl + ...+ c1 · ... · cl =
(b1 − c1) · b2 · ... · bl + (b2 − c2) · b3 · ... · bl · c1 + (b3 − c3) · b4 · ... · bl · c1 · c2...+ (bl − cl) · c2 · ... · cl =
=
∑
1≤i≤l
(bi − ci) · ∏
i<j≤l
bj ·
∏
1≤j<i
cj
 = ∑
1≤i≤l
(γ¯ (ai)− γ¯′ (ai)) ·
∏
i<j≤l
γ¯ (aj) ·
∏
1≤k<i
γ¯′ (ak) .
Eq. (13) is a triangle inequality, and it is strict if l > 1 because the sum inside the “
∣∣∣ ∣∣∣” in (13) includes
both positive and negative elements. Eq. (14) holds because each sum adds the probabilities of disjoint and
exhausting events. The final inequality is implied by Lemma 5.
10We use the convention that a product of an empty set (e.g.,
∏
1≤j<1) is equal to one.
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Case II - Observing a single random type:
‖ψl,γ − ψl,γ′‖1 =
∑
−→a ∈Al
|ψl,γ (−→a )− ψl,γ′ (−→a )| = (15)
∑
−→a ∈Al
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
θ∈Θ
λθ ·
 ∏
1≤i≤l
γθ (ai)−
∏
1≤i≤l
γ′θ (ai)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = (16)
∑
−→a ∈Al
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
θ∈Θ
λθ ·
 ∑
1≤i≤l
(γθ (ai)− γ′θ (ai)) ·
∏
i<j≤l
γθ (aj) ·
∏
1≤j<i
γ′θ (aj)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ (< if l > 1) (17)
∑
−→a ∈Al
∑
θ∈Θ
λθ ·
 ∑
1≤i≤l
|γθ (ai)− γ′θ (ai)| ·
∏
i<j≤l
γθ (aj) ·
∏
1≤j<i
γ′θ (aj)
 =
∑
1≤i≤l
∑
θ∈Θ
λθ ·
 ∑
−→a ∈Al
|γθ (ai)− γ′θ (ai)| ·
∏
i<j≤l
γθ (aj) ·
∏
1≤j<i
γ′θ (aj)
 =
∑
1≤i≤l
∑
θ∈Θ
λθ ·
(∑
ai∈A
|γθ (ai)− γ¯θ ′ (ai)|
)
·
 ∑
(ai+1,...,al)∈Al−i
∏
i<j≤l
γθ (aj)
 ·
 ∑
(ai,...,ai−1)∈Ai−1
∏
1≤j<i
γ′θ (aj)
 =
(18)∑
1≤i≤l
∑
θ∈Θ
λθ ·
(∑
ai∈A
|γθ (ai)− γ¯θ ′ (ai)|
)
· 1 · 1 =
∑
1≤i≤l
∑
θ∈Θ
λθ · ‖γθ − γ′θ‖1 =
∑
1≤i≤l
‖γ − γ′‖1 = l · ‖γ − γ′‖1 .
Eq. (15) is due to the different observations being independent conditional on the observed type θ. Eq. (16)
is implied by adding to the sum elements that cancel out (i.e., a “telescoping series”). Eq. (17) is a triangle
inequality, and it is strict if l > 1 because the sum inside the “
∣∣∣ ∣∣∣” in (17) includes both positive and negative
elements. Eq. (18) holds because each sum adds the probabilities of disjoint and exhausting events.
Lemma 5. ‖γ¯ − γ¯′‖1 ≤ ‖γ − γ′‖1 for each two states γ 6= γ′ ∈ Γ.
Proof.
‖γ − γ′‖1 =
∑
θ∈Θ
λθ · ‖γθ − γ′θ‖1 =
∑
θ∈Θ
λθ ·
∑
a∈A
|γθ (a)− γ′θ (a)| =
∑
a∈A
∑
θ∈Θ
λθ · |γθ (a)− γ′θ (a)| ≥
∑
a∈A
∣∣∣∣∣∑
θ∈Θ
λθ (γθ (a)− γ′θ (a))
∣∣∣∣∣ = ∑
a∈A
∣∣∣∣∣∑
θ∈Θ
λθγθ (a)−
∑
θ∈Θ
λθγ
′
θ (a)
∣∣∣∣∣ = ∑
a∈A
|γ¯ (a)− γ¯′ (a)| = ‖γ¯ − γ¯′‖1 ,
where the various equalities are immediately implied by the definitions on the L1-norm and γ¯, and the inequality
is a triangle inequality.
B Lemma Required for the Proof of Theorem 5
Lemma 6. For each social learning environment E, each size l ∈ N, each type θ ∈ Θ, and any two states
γ 6= γ′ ∈ Γ:
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∑
a∈A
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
m∈Al
(ψl,γ (m)− ψl,γ′ (m)) · σθ,m (a)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ rθ,l · ‖ψl,γ − ψl,γ′‖1 .
Proof. We begin with a preliminary definition. Let Alγ>γ′ ⊆ Al be the set of samples that have higher
probabilities given state γ than given state γ′, i.e.,
Alγ>γ′ =
{
m ∈ Al|ψl,γ (m) > ψl,γ′ (m)
}
.
We now prove the lemma: ∑
a∈A
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
m∈Al
(ψl,γ (m)− ψl,γ′ (m)) · σθ,m (a)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ =
∑
a∈A
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
m∈Al
γ>γ′
(ψl,γ (m)− ψl,γ′ (m)) · σθ,m (a)−
∑
m∈Al
γ′>γ
(ψl,γ′ (m)− ψl,γ (m)) · σθ,m (a)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∑
a∈A
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
m∈Al
γ>γ′
(ψl,γ (m)− ψl,γ′ (m)) · σθ,l (a)−
∑
m∈Al
γ′>γ
(ψl,γ′ (m)− ψl,γ (m)) · σθ,l (a)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ =
∑
a∈A
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣σθ,l (a) ·
∑
m∈Al
γ>γ′
(ψl,γ (m)− ψl,γ′ (m))− σθ,l (a) ·
∑
m∈Al
γ′>γ
(ψl,γ′ (m)− ψl,γ (m))
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = (19)
∑
a∈A
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(
σθ,l (a)− σθ,l (a)
) · ∑
m∈Al
γ>γ′
(ψl,γ (m)− ψl,γ′ (m))
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ =∑
a∈A
(
σθ,l (a)− σθ,l (a)
) · ∑
m∈Al
γ>γ′
(ψl,γ (m)− ψl,γ′ (m)) =
∑
a∈A
(
σθ,l (a)− σθ,l (a)
) · 0.5 ·
∑
m∈Al
|(ψl,γ (m)− ψl,γ′ (m))|
 =
0.5 ·
∑
a∈A
(
σθ,l (a)− σθ,l (a)
) · ‖ψl,γ − ψl,γ′‖1 .
Equality (19) is implied by the fact that ψl,γ and ψl,γ′ are both distributions, and the sum of the differences
in the probabilities that they assign to samples of size l must be equal to zero. Thus we have shown that
∑
a∈A
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
m∈Al
(ψl,γ (m)− ψl,γ′ (m)) · σθ,m (a)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 0.5 ·
∑
a∈A
(
σθ,l (a)− σθ,l (a)
) · ‖ψl,γ − ψl,γ′‖1 , (20)
which together with Lemma 3 implies that the LHS of (20) is weakly smaller than rθ,l · ‖ψl,γ − ψl,γ′‖1 .
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